[11]
but if a man does an injury of set purpose, he is guilty of
injustice, and injustice of the sort that renders the doer an unjust man, if it be an act
that violates proportion or equality. Similarly one who acts justly on purpose is a just
man; but he acts justly only if he acts voluntarily.
[12]
Of involuntary actions some are pardonable and some are not. Errors not merely committed
in ignorance but caused by ignorance are pardonable; those committed in ignorance, but
caused not by that ignorance but by unnatural or inhuman passion, are
unpardonable.9.
But it may perhaps be doubted whether our discussion of suffering and doing injustice has
been sufficiently definite; and in the first place, whether the matter really is as
Euripides has put it in the strange lines1— “
I killed my mother—that's the tale in brief!
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?
” Is it really possible to suffer injustice2 voluntarily, or on the contrary is suffering injustice always
involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? And again, is suffering
injustice always voluntary, or always involuntary, or sometimes one and sometimes the
other?
[2]
And similarly with being treated justly
(acting justly being always voluntary). Thus it would be reasonable to
suppose that both being treated unjustly and being
treated justly are similarly opposed to acting unjustly and acting justly respectively:
that either both are voluntary or both involuntary. But it would seem paradoxical to
assert that even being treated justly is always voluntary; for people are sometimes
treated justly against their will.
[3]
The fact is that the
further question might be raised, must a man who has had an unjust thing done to him
always be said to have been treated unjustly, or does the same thing hold good of
suffering as of doing something unjust? One may be a party to a just act, whether as its
agent or its object, incidentally.3 And
the same clearly is true of an unjust act: doing what is unjust is not identical with
acting unjustly, nor yet is suffering what is unjust identical with being treated
unjustly, and the same is true of acting and being treated justly; for to be treated
unjustly requires someone who acts unjustly, and to be treated justly requires someone who
acts justly.
[4]
But if to act unjustly is simply to do harm voluntarily, and voluntarily means knowing
the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of injury, it will follow both that
the man of defective self-restraint, inasmuch as he voluntarily harms himself, voluntarily
suffers injustice, and also that it is possible for a man to act unjustly towards himself
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