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But things that are akin to things of different kinds must themselves differ in kind.
[3]
A still clearer proof may be drawn from the hindrance
that activities receive from the pleasure derived from other activities. For instance,
persons fond of the flute cannot give their attention to a philosophical discussion when
they overhear someone playing the flute, because they enjoy music more than the activity
in which they are engaged; therefore the pleasure afforded by the music of the flute
impairs the activity of study.
[4]
The same thing occurs in
other cases when a man tries to do two things at once; the pleasanter activity drives out
the other, the more so if it is much more pleasant, until the other activity ceases
altogether. Hence, when we enjoy something very much, we can hardly do anything else; and
when we find a thing only mildly agreeable, we turn to some other occupation; for
instance, people who eat sweets at the theater do so especially when the acting is bad.
[5]
And since our activities are sharpened, prolonged and
improved by their own pleasure, and impaired by the pleasures of other activities, it is
clear that pleasures differ widely from each other. In fact alien pleasures have almost
the same effect on the activities as their own pains1; since, when an activity causes pain, this pain
destroys it, for instance, if a person finds writing or doing sums unpleasant and irksome;
for he stops writing or doing sums, because the activity is painful. Activities then are affected in opposite ways by the pleasures and
the pains that belong to them, that is to say, those that are intrinsically due to their
exercise. Alien pleasures, as has been said, have very much the same effect as pain, for
they destroy an activity, only not to the same degree.
[6]
Again, since activities differ in moral value, and some are to be adopted, others to be
avoided, and others again are neutral, the same is true also of their pleasures: for each
activity has a pleasure of its own. Thus the pleasure of a good activity is morally good,
that of a bad one morally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires
for base things blamed; but the pleasures contained in our activities are more intimately
connected with them than the appetites which prompt them, for the appetite is both
separate in time and distinct in its nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is
closely linked to the activity, indeed so inseparable from it as to raise a doubt whether
the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure.
[7]
However, we must not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a
sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem
to some people to be the same.
As then activities are diverse, so also are their pleasures.
1 i.e., the special pain accompanying a particular activity when it functions badly or in relation to a bad object.