13. That pain moreover is
an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil
as being some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something
to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be
good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this
argument1 by saying
that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is
opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not
hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.
[2]
But granting （2） that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore
follow （3） that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme
Good; just as a certain form of knowledge may be supremely good, although some forms of
knowledge are bad. On the contrary （i） since every faculty has its
unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them
（whichever constitutes Happiness） , when unimpeded, must probably be the
most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this
showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure, even though most pleasures
are bad, and, it may be, bad absolutely. This is why everybody thinks that the happy life
must be a pleasant life, and regards pleasure as a necessary ingredient of happiness; and
with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially
perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods
and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of
them.
[3]
（Consequently those who say2 that, if a man be good,
he will be happy even when on the rack, or when
fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking
nonsense.）
[4]
But because Happiness requires the
gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune;
but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is an impediment to
activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good
fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness.
[5]
（ii.） Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure
is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good: “
No rumor noised abroad by many peoples
Comes utterly to naught.3
”
[6]
But they do not all pursue the same pleasure, since the natural state and the best state
neither is nor seems to be the same for them all; yet still they all pursue pleasure.
Indeed it is possible that in reality they do not pursue the pleasure which they think and
would say they do, but all the same pleasure; for nature has implanted in all things
something divine.4 But as the
pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are
capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only
pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know.
This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section
Table of Contents:
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com