Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

[3] Not but what it would appear that the end corresponding¹ to the virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honors of victory—is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and all the labor of training is painful; and these painful incidentals are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any pleasure at all. [4] If then the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring will be painful to the courageous man, and he will suffer them unwillingly; but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. And the more complete his virtue, and the fuller the happiness he has attained, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is worth most, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this is so, and this must be painful. But he is none the less courageous on that account, perhaps indeed he is more so, because he prefers glory in war to the greatest prizes of life. [5]

It is not true therefore of every virtue that its active exercise is essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.² [6]

No doubt it is possible that such men as these do not make the best professional soldiers, but men who are less courageous, and have nothing of value besides life to lose; for these face danger readily, and will barter their lives for trifling gains. [7]

Let this suffice as an account of Courage: from what has been said it will not be difficult to form at all events a rough conception of its nature.10.

After Courage let us speak of Temperance; for these appear to be the virtues of the irrational parts of the soul.

Now we have said³ that Temperance is the observance of the mean in relation to pleasures （for it is concerned only in a lesser degree and in a different way with pains）; and Profligacy also is displayed in the same matters. Let us then now define the sort of pleasures to which these qualities are related. [2]

Now we must make a distinction between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul: Take for instance ambition, or love of learning: the lover of honor or of learning takes pleasure in the thing he loves without his body being affected at all; the experience is purely mental. But we do not speak of men as either temperate or profligate in relation to the pleasures of ambition and of learning. Nor similarly can these terms be applied to the enjoyment of any of the other pleasures that are not bodily pleasures: those who love hearing marvellous tales and telling anecdotes, and who spend their days in trivial gossip, we call idle chatterers, but not profligates;