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in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. [9]

It may even be held that this is the true self of each,1 inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than himself.

Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the pleasantest life2 for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest. 8.

The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I mean, Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all of these things seem to be purely human affairs. [2] And some moral actions are thought to be the outcome of the physical constitution, and moral virtue is thought to have a close affinity in many respects with the passions. [3] Moreover, Prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence, inasmuch as the first Principles which Prudence employs are determined by the Moral Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by Prudence. But these being also connected with the passions are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate3: so much may be said about it here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose. [4] And such happiness would appear to need but little external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue.4 Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessaries of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher) ; for in this respect there may be little difference between them. But for the purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous? [5] It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both;

1 Cf. 9.4.3, 4; 8.6.

2 Cf. 1.8.14.

3 In Aristot. De anima 3.5 Aristotle distinguishes the active from the passive intellect, and pronounces the former to be ‘separate or separable (from matter, or the body), unmixed and impassible.’

4 Cf. 7.4, 8.9, 10, and 1.8.15-17.

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