This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section
both sorts of Injustice being exhibited in a man's relation to
others; but whereas Injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honor or money or
security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the
pleasure of gain, Injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that
are the sphere of Virtue.2.
[7]
Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of Justice than one, and that the term has
another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. We have then to ascertain the nature and
attributes of Justice in this special sense.2.
[8]
Now we have distinguished two meanings of ‘the unjust,’ namely the
unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of ‘the just,’
namely the lawful and the equal or fair. Injustice then, in the sense previously
mentioned, corresponds to the meaning ‘unlawful’; 2.
[9]
but since the unfair is not the same as
the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not
everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the
unjust and Injustice in the particular sense are not the same as the unjust and Injustice
in the universal sense, but different from them, and related to them as part to whole; for
Injustice in this sense is a part of universal Injustice, and similarly the Justice we are
now considering is a part of universal Justice. We have therefore to discuss Justice and
Injustice, and the just and unjust, in the particular sense.2.
[10]
We may then set aside that Justice which is coextensive with virtue in general, being the
practice of virtue in general towards someone else,
and that Injustice which is the practice of vice in general towards someone else. It is
also clear how we should define what is just and unjust in the corresponding senses. For
the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions
that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the various particular
virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices. Also the regulations
laid down for the education that fits a man for social life are the rules productive of
virtue in general. 2.
[11]
As
for the education of the individual as such, that makes a man simply a good man, the
question whether this is the business of Political Science or of some other science must
be determined later: for it would seem that to be a good man is not in every case the same
thing as to be a good citizen.1
2.
[12]
Particular Justice on the other hand, and that which is just in the sense corresponding
to it, is divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in the distribution of honor,
wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its
members in equal or unequal shares.
1 This topic is discussed in Politics 3. Under certain forms of government the good man in the moral sense may not be a good citizen, that is, a citizen who will help to maintain the constitution.