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in the practical
sciences the end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but
rather to carry out our theories in action.
[2]
If so, to
know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to possess and to practice it, or in
some other manner actually ourselves to become good.
[3]
Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make men virtuous,
‘large fees and many’ (as Theognis1 says) ‘would they
win,’ quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted.
But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous
youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble,
can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate
the mass of mankind to moral nobility.
[4]
For it is the
nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not to a sense of honor, and to abstain from
evil not because of its baseness but because of the penalties it entails; since, living as
they do by passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature, and the things that
will procure those pleasures, and avoid the opposite pains, but have not even a notion of
what is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted true pleasure.
[5]
What theory then can reform the natures of men like these? To dislodge
by argument habits long firmly rooted in their characters is difficult if not impossible.
We may doubtless think ourselves fortunate if we attain some measure of virtue when all
the things believed to make men virtuous are ours.
[6]
Now some thinkers hold that virtue is a gift of nature; others think we become good by
habit, others that we can be taught to be good. Natural endowment is obviously not under
our control; it is bestowed on those who are fortunate, in the true sense, by some divine
dispensation. Again, theory and teaching are not, I fear, equally efficacious in all
cases: the soil must have been previously tilled if it is to foster the seed, the mind of
the pupil must have been prepared by the cultivation of habits, so as to like and dislike
aright.
[7]
For he that lives at the dictates of passion will
not hear nor understand the reasoning of one who tries to dissuade him; but if so, how can
you change his mind by argument?
And, speaking generally, passion seems not to be amenable to reason, but only to force.
[8]
We must therefore by some means secure that the character shall have at the outset a
natural affinity for virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base. And it is
difficult to obtain a right education in virtue from youth up without being brought up
under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most men,
especially when young; hence the nurture and exercises of the young should be regulated by
law, since temperance and hardiness will not be painful when they have become habitual.