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now
the perfection of virtue will clearly consist in both; but the performance of virtuous
actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the
actions are.
[6]
But the student, so far as the pursuit of
his activity is concerned, needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may
almost be said to be a hindrance to contemplation; though it is true that, being a man and
living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in virtuous action, and so will need
external goods to carry on his life as a human being.
[7]
The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some form of
contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them, enjoy supreme felicity and
happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? Just actions? but will it
not seem ridiculous to think of them as making contracts, restoring deposits and the like?
Then brave actions—enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so
doing? Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would be absurd to
suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of some sort! And temperate
actions—what will these mean in their case? surely it would be derogatory to
praise them for not having evil desires! If we go through the list we shall find that all
forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet nevertheless they
have always been conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for
we cannot suppose they are always asleep like
Endymion. But for a living being, if we eliminate action, and a
fortiori creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the
activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation;
and therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity of
contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.
[8]
A further confirmation is that the lower animals cannot partake of happiness, because
they are completely devoid of the contemplative activity. The whole of the life of the
gods is blessed, and that of man is so in so far as it contains some likeness to the
divine activity; but none of the other animals possess happiness, because they are
entirely incapable of contemplation. Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its range with
contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty of contemplation, the more
it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in
it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of
contemplation.
[9]
But the philosopher being a man will also need external well—being, since man's
nature is not self—sufficient for the activity of contemplation, but he must
also have bodily health and a supply of food and other requirements.