Ἦ καὶ ἂν μὴ
κτλ. “H. e. ἄν τι
μὴ σοφόν. Nam τι e superiore ὅ τι facile intelligas” (Stallb.).
Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν
κτλ. This distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is much insisted on
by Plato; see esp. Rep. 477 ff.; Meno 99 A: cp. Isocr. Hel. 209 A. For τὸ ἔχειν λόγον
δοῦναι as the distinctive mark of ἐπιστήμη, cp. Meno 98 A;
but this definition is criticised unfavourably in Theaet. 201 C ff. (see Zeller, Plato, pp.
171 ff.). I bracket καὶ before ἄνευ: if retained, we must render with Rückert (and Hug)
“auch ohne Rechenschaft geben zu
können.” For this “intensive” use of καί, see Thompson on Meno 71 B. Rettig defends the Bodleian ὀρθοδοξάζειν thus “ὀρθὰ
δοξάζειν ginge auf Einzelnes und Thatsächliches, nicht auf den
Begriff als solchen und die geistige Eigenschaft”: but this distinction is
imaginary, and there is no other evidence, in Plato or elsewhere, for the existence of
this compound, Aristotle's word (E. N. VII. 8. 4) being ὀρθοδοξέω. Possibly we should write καὶ <ὄντα> ἄ., cp. Rep. 413 A.
μεταξὺ φρον<*>σεως κτλ.
Cp. Rep. 477 A
μεταξύ τι...ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης: ib. 478 D.
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The Symposium of Plato. R. G. Bury. 1909. Cambridge. W. Heffer and Sons.
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