James A. Towle, Commentary on Plato: Protagoras
James A. Towle, Ed.

κακόν: subst. (without τὶ) as Gorg. 518 e καὶ σὺ νῦν ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει, or in the exclamation of those initiated in the Orphic-Bacchic mysteries (Dem. de Cor. 259), ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον, and in the common phrases, δεινὸν λέγεις (Ar. Lysistr. 499), γελοῖον πάσχειν (Rep. vii. 536 b) etc.

μοί: for the dat. of the agent, see G. 188, 3; H. 769.

ἰώμενος . . . ποιῶ: the expression was proverbial, μὴ κακὸν κακῷ ἰάσασθαι. Cf. Hdt. iii. 53 μὴ τῷ κακῷ τὸ κακὸν ἰῶ, Thuc. v. 65 ἐπεβόησεν ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, Soph. Aj. 362 μὴ κακὸν κακῷ διδοὺς | ἄκος πλέον τὸ πῆμα τῆς ἄτης τίθει do not, adding ill as a remedy to ill, make the woe of thy calamity the greater, the comic poet in Plut. Mor. 523 e τὸ φάρμακόν σου τὴν νόσον μείζω ποιεῖ. The const. is an ‘epexegetic asyndeton,’ as in 339 e δίκαιος εἶ, 343 d ἀμφισβητοῦντα, 343 e εἰπόντα . . . ἀποκρινόμενον, 348 a καταθεμένους ποιεῖσθαι.

πολλὴ ἂν ἀμαθία εἴη κτἑ.: it seemed not to occur to Protagoras, although believing ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέ- γιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι (cf. 339 a), to consider the argument of the poem as a whole, or to refute Socrates by a critical examination and comparison of its parts. Nor again did he cite other passages from his favorite poet, to establish the doctrine of the latter respecting virtue. His method here is the same which he uses elsewhere, cf. 324 a αὐτό σε διδάξει and ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται, where, without any scientific treatment of the doctrine of punishment, he falls back upon ‘common sense.’ This mode of exegesis proved, as it has often done since, to be unsafe, when placed in the hands of an opponent.