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εἴτε . . . ὀνομάζων: Plato frequently alludes thus to the custom of using various bynames in invocations of the gods, as πολυωνυμία showed the manifold honor of the deity. Cf. Crat. 400 e ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι by whatever names and whence soever they please to be invoked, Symp. 212 c τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐγκώμιον νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων (whatever and however you choose to name it), τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε, Aesch. Ag. 160 Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ̓ ἐστίν.— ὁπόθεν... λανγ̂γρεεκ>ὀνομάζων: cf. Hom. K 68 πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.
τοῦτο κτἑ.: “use that expression, that word, which pleases you best, in your reply to my question.” Cf. Symp. 212 c.
ἐπὶ τούτου: cannot express an aim, the actions directed at this (πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σάμου Thuc. i. 116 and similar expressions are entirely different); but the meaning is that, “the actions belonging in this sphere (viz. of the agreeable and painless life), so soon as the agreeable and the good are one and the same, are noble.” ἐπὶ τούτου can then be compared with ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου Phaedr. 242 a and similar passages.—The whole passage αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου . . . ὠφέλιμον is somewhat strange. But Socrates wishes to show that no one who knows what is truly agreeable, and is aware that the truly and permanently agreeable is good, will do, or will wish to do, anything that does not bring this pleasure. Hence Socrates concludes that, if the agreeable is good, all actions connected with this are noble, and consequently good and useful. For no one will wish to do anything else than what is good and useful.
καὶ δυνατά: every one is perfectly conscious that there are deeds better than his own, but which he does not do because they are beyond his power. Thus ἄλλα βελτίω needs the limitation καὶ δυνατά, and this alone gives meaning to the words ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω.— ἔπειτα: see on 319d, l. 26.
Hermann Sauppe. James A. Towle. Commentary on Plato: Protagoras. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1889.
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