This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
50 f. Protagoras introduces a singu lar flaw into his logic. He has admitted (350 a) that οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσι, and that ῾β̓ οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι (sc. οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης) οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, and Socrates has drawn the inference (c) ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη (i.e. ἐστί). Now, however, Protagoras declares that οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι δυνατώτεροί εἰσι τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων, then, omitting the needful premise οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δυνατοὶ οὐκ ἰσχυροί εἰσι, which of course no one would think of asserting, he would have Socrates draw the conclusion ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς.
τούτοις: does not depend upon τοῖς αὐτοῖς, but τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις simply repeats and strengthens τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ above.
Hermann Sauppe. James A. Towle. Commentary on Plato: Protagoras. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1889.
The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.