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ἐν οἷς . . . τοῖς λόγοις: i.e. as Socrates had been leading the discussion. Cf. 351 e, l. 29. On the const., see on 342 b οὓς . . . τοὺς σοφιστάς.
ἄρτι: cf. 358 c, ll. 22 ff.
ἐπειδὴ . . . οὖσα: several critics would strike out these words; but they contain a brief repetition of the argument to which Protagoras has just referred. People commonly say that one sometimes does the evil knowingly, suffering oneself to be overcome by ἡδονή (cf. 352 d ff., 353 c). But now Socrates has shown that no one does this, but he who seems to do it, simply lacks the proper knowledge of good and evil; that consequently the ἥττω εἶναι ἡδονῆς or, as in 358 c, ἥττω εἶναι αὑτοῦ is only ἀμαθία. It is entirely correct therefore to say here briefly “we can assert that no man chooses that which he holds to be evil, because ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ has been shown to be ἀμαθία.”
ταύτῃ: in this respect.
Hermann Sauppe. James A. Towle. Commentary on Plato: Protagoras. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1889.
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