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eve of marriage, his death fell like a pall on many loving hearts.
Lee at first reported his losses at “about 1,800 killed and wounded” --one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone.
His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of Longstreet and Jackson, was over 5,000,1 and may probably be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners.
He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns.
Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at Lee's headquarters of The Times (London) calls “a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic.”
Not so, O owl-eyed scribe!
but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more benignant destiny!
It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own2 that Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal.
horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's lines had been proved impregnable at a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old Sumner — who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in — and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness.
Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice.
1 Longstreet reports his losses tims: killed, 251; wounded, 1,516; missing, 127: total, 1,894. Jackson gives his as — killed, 344; wounded, 2,545; missing, 526: total, 3,415: grand total, 5,309. Among their killed, beside those already mentioned, was Brig-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, of Ga., brother of Howell Cobb. Among their wounded, were Brig.-Gens. J. R. Cooke and W. D. Pender.
2 He says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed; still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme advance. That night, I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning; in fact, it was decidedly against it. I returned to my headquarters, and, after conversation with Gen. Samner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps--which was the corps I originally commanded — to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some 18 old regiments, and some new ones; and I desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by coming quickly up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, foreing the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the order. The order was given, and the column of attack was formed. The next morning, just before the column was to have started. Gen. Sumner came to me and said: “General. I hope you will desist from this attack: I do not know of any general officer who approves of it; and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.” Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same impression prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated. And besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack: that he would give me all the support that he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried.
Hartford. Published by O. D. Chase and Company. 1866.
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