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be commanded by
Gen. Nath'l
P. Banks.
Gen. McClellan, “in compliance with the
President's War Order No. 2,” made this disposition.
1
Gen. McClellan's original plan contemplated an advance on
Richmond by way of the lower
Rappahannock, landing at
Urbana, and making a secondary base of
West Point, at the head of
York river; and this would seem, whether regarded abstractly or in the light of subsequent experience, to be far preferable to the route on which he ultimately decided, having its base at
Fortress Monroe; but either of these, and indeed any approach to
Richmond otherwise than from the north, was exposed to the serious if not fatal objection that it involved a division and dispersion of our forces, or left the
National metropolis, with its enormous depots of arms, munitions, and provisions, to say nothing of its edifices and archives, at the mercy of the
Rebels, who could hardly fail to rush upon, sack, and burn it, if our grand army were transferred bodily to the base of the
Virginian Peninsula.
The President, therefore, before giving his assent to
Gen. McClellan's project, addressed to him the following letter:
my dear Sir: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the
Chesapeake, up the
Rappahannock to
Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the
York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of
Manassas.
If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:
1st.
Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of
time and
money than mine?
2d.
Wherein is a victory
more certain by your plan than mine?
3d.
Wherein is a victory
more valuable by your plan than mine?
4th.
In fact, would it not be
less valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?
5th.
In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?
Yours, truly,
These inquiries seem not to have been directly answered; but, in a long letter of even date, to the
Secretary of War,
Gen. McClellan urges the strength of the
Rebel position at and around
Manassas Junction; the reported fact that the fords of the
Occoquan were watched by the
Rebels and defended by concealed batteries on the heights in their rear, which were being strengthened by additional intrenchments; that, during our advance from the
Accotink to the
Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station,
Sangster's, and
Union Mills; that it would not do to divide our army by leaving a portion in front of
Centerville while the rest crosses the
Occoquan; that the roads in this quarter were liable, for some time yet, to be obstructed by rains and snow, so that “it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march ;” and that--
Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained.
I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true: but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's