[349d]
of both.”
“Admirably put,” he said. “But the unjust man
is intelligent and good and the just man neither.”
“That, too, is right,” he said. “Is it not
also true,” I said, “that the unjust man is like the
intelligent and good and the just man is not?” “Of
course,” he said, “being such he will be like to such
and the other not.” “Excellent. Then each is such1 as that to which he is like.”
“What else do you suppose?” he said. “Very
well, Thrasymachus,
1 The assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus's ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in “Substitution of Similars”; “Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like.” But practical logic requires the qualification “in respect of their likness.” Socrates, however, argues that since the good man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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