[523d]
equally a finger,1 and in this respect
it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either
extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of
this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to
question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty
of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite
of a finger.” “Why, no, it does not,” he said.
“Then,” said I, “it is to be expected that such a
perception will not provoke or awaken2
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