[359b]
not as a real good, but as a thing honored in
the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it
and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody either to
wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice
is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it
originates, according to the theory.“But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so
unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be
most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this
in thought:
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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