[586d]
pursuing these ends without
regard to consideration and reason?” “The same sort of
thing,” he said, “must necessarily happen in this case
too.” “Then,” said I, “may we not
confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of
our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and,
pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,1 take only
those pleasures which reason approves,2 will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest3
pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that
are proper to them and their own,
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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