Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias

ταύτης: draws attention to the earlier explanation in 452 e, from which is drawn (τοίνυν) the following definition, which in form follows as an epexegesis to ταύτης τῆς πειθοῦς. The definition answers the ποῖον as far as the external matters of persons (speakers) and place are concerned, and is used by Socrates (c) in order to obtain a definition that characterizes the nature of the πειθώ. Gorgias does not use ὄχλοις with the disparaging feeling which it sometimes has, but as a general word for assemblies.

περὶ τούτων κτἑ.: answers the question περὶ τί 4, above. On the change of case, cf. 449 d.

ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα κτἑ.: this sentence is a good example of those curious anacolutha which occur so often in the conversation of ordinary life, where a slight emphasis on a single word may perhaps change the whole construction, and cause the speaker to lose himself in a network of clauses, of which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: “I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings.” In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπανερωτῶ. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with δοκεῖ μέν, in dependence on ὅ) causes him to branch off, in the clause ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, in order to explain the reason for his repeated questioning, and at the same time to reiterate one of the fundamental principles of dialectic.

ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: refers to 453 b.

ὑπονοεῖν: “to form a pre-opin