Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias

sonal dat. σοὶ seems strange, since it can neither be understood as 482 b below, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, nor as 477 d above, αἴσχιστον ἀδικία . . . ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, for ὁμολογεῖται (conveniunt, consentanea sunt) has its dat. in τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. But it is not superfluous; its force seems to be this: “but perhaps you can make it agree with what precedes.” Thus the dat., as well as ἴσως, would serve the author's purpose in delineating Polus' character, who by such shallow artifices seeks to weaken his admissions, and, as far as possible, relieve himself from any responsibility in the results,—a design which Socrates balks by his following question. See on 477 d, 478 a, and H. 770, 771.

κἀκεῖνα: καί assumes εἰ τάδε ἄτοπα δοκεῖ, thus noticing Polus' observation.

λυτέον: a metaphor drawn from such usage as λύειν γέφυραν. Cf. Prot. 332 e, Xen. An. ii. 4. 19. A different meaning appears in διαλύειν τὸν λόγον, 458 b, after διαλύειν τὴν συνουσίαν in 457 c.

τοὐναντίον: the heaping up of such kindred ideas as αὖ, αὖθις, πάλιν is not uncommon (see examples in Kr. 69, 12); τοὐναντίον means “on the contrary”; αὖ, “on the other hand”; μεταβαλόντα (intransitive), “vice versa.”

εἰ ἄρα: if, assuming the ordinary view to be the correct one (ἄρα).—

τινὰ: is object, and with it εί̀τε . . . ὁντινοῦν is in apposition. ἐχθρός is a personal enemy, as distinguished from πολέμιος, a national enemy.

ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς κτἑ.: because experiencing injury might be held as a kind of substitute for the punishment due for inflicting it.

αὐτός: refers to the subject of κακῶς ποιεῖν, which is indefinite.—

τοῦτο κτἑ.: the insertion of this clause, which is due to the preceding ἐὰν μόνον κτἑ., defers the completion of the sentence to παντὶ τρόπῳ κτἑ.