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τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα: refer probably to the discussion of 494 a-495 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν are the same.
πάλαι τοι κτἑ.: like all who try only to gain their point, not to arrive at the truth, Callicles seeks to evade the now inevitable confession of his error by representing his previous statement as a mere joke. But cf. 495 a-c.
τούτου: ἔχεσθαι, to hold fast, takes the gen. See G. 171, 1; H. 738.— ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια: boys easily receive as genuine what one tries to impose upon them. Farther than this, the comparison is not to be pressed. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει: see on 468 e. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.
ἡδονάς: the natural position would be τὰς μὲν ἡδονὰς βελτίους κτἑ. The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that τὰς μέν was not sufficiently definite. Just as if you suppose that I, etc., do not believe that some are better,—pleasures, I mean,—others worse.
Gonzalez Lodge. Commentary on Plato Gorgias. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1891.
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