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fore Socrates does not allow himself to be deterred by the trouble it will involve to bring Polus to the same opinion. ταὐτὰ λέγειν (καὶ φρονεῖν) is held as a sign of friendship, just as διαφέρεσθαι of enmity. See on 510 c and Sall. Cat. 20 nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est. At the same time the words contain a delicate reply to Polus' discourteous exclamation. Socrates will soon bring him to say what is in his own view ἄτοπον.
16 f. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: cf. 469 b.
τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . εἶναι: is cited as an example of rather uncommon use of the indir. disc. inf. after εἶπον (GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to be looked at rather as the object of εἶπον in the sense of “declare.”
καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ: of course the addition of Socrates after Polus' reply throws a quite different coloring over this sentence. Polus' self-assurance is apparent in ϝαὶ μὰ Δία, his positiveness in ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος. ἴσως shows no uncertainty, but is only the conscious under-statement which is common in English. See on 480 a.
Gonzalez Lodge. Commentary on Plato Gorgias. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1891.
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