Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias

συμποδισθεὶς ἐπεστομίσθη: a combination of two metaphors, both of which refer to a horse which has been caught by a noose, and then guided according to a strange will by a bridle which has been forced into its mouth. In the same way Polus, by that unlucky admission, allowed himself to be noosed, and was thus compelled to follow the lead of Socrates, wherever that might take him.

τῷ ὄντι: affirms the justice of the accusation made against Socrates by Polus.

φορτικά: a word not uncommon in Plato, is used in Euthyd. 287 a of insidious catch-questions. See on Apol. 32 a, where combined with δικανικά it is used of the tediousness of those detailed discussions from which Socrates, after the manner of an orator before a court, seeks to draw his proofs. Here Callicles probably wants to indicate the vulgarity of such illustrations and talks, as being fit only for the uncultured multitude. The rel. sentence ἃ φύσει κτἑ. is connected epexegetically with τοιαῦτα, and thereby the conclusion from the special case is made of general application. It was indeed from the idea of the καλόν that Socrates drew the whole argument with which he refuted Polus.

φύσει μὲν, νόμῳ δέ: the opposition of natural right to conventional right (law) was first definitely maintained by Hippias of Elis. Cf. Prot. 337

ξ δ, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 14. After him this principle was accepted and made a commonplace by all the Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias himself did not defend it, but his teaching can be traced back to it. This principle Callicles now proceeds to unfold. Of kindred import is also the discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles, related by Xen. Mem. i. 2. 40 ff.