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οὐκοῦν κτἑ.: the sentence is merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after δύνασθαι (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with σκεψώμεθα κτἑ.— πάλιν αὖ: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.
φαίνεται: has its subject in τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, and its predicate in ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι. “Does not then this great power of yours (πάλιν αὖ) appear to you (only provided the one who does what seems good to him proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing,—and that, as it seems, is the real (τό) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power.” The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation.
εἰ δὲ μή: is phraseological, “otherwise.” The contrast is with τοῦτο, and through this with ἐὰν μὲν κτἑ. The subject of κακόν (ἐστι) καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι is, of course, the phrase τὸ πράττειν ἃ δοκεῖ, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.
ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d.
Gonzalez Lodge. Commentary on Plato Gorgias. Ginn & Company. Boston and London. 1891.
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