Gonzalez Lodge, Commentary on Plato: Gorgias

ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κτἑ.: τὸ σοφόν (artifice, trick) is used somewhat scornfully in the sense in which the sophistical Eristics employed it, with whom Callicles puts Socrates on a level. Hence he also employs towards him the word κακουργεῖν, which was used among the Eristics to denote crafty tripping in discussion. Cf. Rep. i. 341 a οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, by which Thrasymachus declares his ability to defend himself against such unfair treatment; so ib. 338 d. The same feel ing determines the choice of the compound ὑπερωτᾶν “to slip artfully into the question,” “ask slily”.

τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν: is epexegetic to ὅ.

ἐὰν δὲ κτἑ.: supply the same verbs as are found in the first member of the sentence.

ὥσπερ αὐτίκα: as, for example. See on 472 d.

ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν: ‘you followed up what he meant “conventionally” by arguing upon it in the “natural” sense.’ Cope. I.e. Socrates had treated the concession of Polus, and drawn his results from it, as if Polus had therein conceded that to do wrong was by nature, i.e. of itself, more ugly than to suffer wrong. “For —so runs the argument of Callicles —that which is by nature ugly coincides with what is evil, which latter, however, is the suffering of wrong. But we must not conclude from this that what is by law the more ugly is also the greater evil.”

27 f.

τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι: as the passage stands, must be considered as explanatory of the preceding, without close construction.