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τούτου οὗ λέγεις κτἑ.: the concrete example διψῶντα πίνειν Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz ation that pain and pleasure can both be present in the same act follows later.

μάλιστα: like σφόδρα γε in d above, gives emphatic assent. μάλιστα has become the general word for “yes” in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of ναί.

29 f.

εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος: for Socrates' argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only of the nature of the ideas them selves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas.

φῄς: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.

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    • Plato, Gorgias, 495e
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