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[*] 666. The term indirect discourse or oratio obliqua includes all clauses which express indirectly the words or thoughts of any person (including those of the speaker himself), after verbs which imply thought or the expression of thought (verba sentiendi et declarandi), and after such expressions as φαίνεται, it appears, δοκεῖ, it seems, δῆλόν ἐστιν, it is evident, σαφές ἐστιν, etc. The term may be further applied to any single dependent clause, in any sentence, which indirectly expresses the thought of any other person than the speaker (or past thoughts of the speaker himself), even when the preceding or following clauses are not in indirect discourse. (See 694 and 684.)
Macmillan. London, Melbourne, Toronto. 1889. reprint edition:. St. Martin's Press. New York. 1965.
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