William Watson Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb

Appendix

---

The Relation of the Optative to the Subjunctive and Other Moods.

In the chapter on the general view of the moods, no attempt was made to assign to either the subjunctive or the optative a single “fundamental idea” from which all the uses of the mood could be derived, except so far as the idea of futurity was shown to belong essentially to the subjunctive in all its most primitive uses. It would be impossible to include under one fundamental idea all the actual uses of any mood in Greek, except the imperative; for even the indicative is used to express unfulfilled conditions, unaccomplished wishes, and unattained purposes, none of which can be brought under the ideas of “declaration” or “absolute assertion” commonly attributed to this mood. Again, it is not to be expected that the true fundamental idea of any mood should include all its uses in a developed language; for the fortunes of language often depend on causes which are quite independent of the original essence of the forms employed, and which seldom can be referred to invariable laws of thought. The same idea can be expressed in two cognate languages by different moods: as he would have seen is ei)=den a)/n in Greek and vidisset in Latin, while in Sanskrit it would be expressed by a past augmented future equivalent to the Greek e)/mellen o)/yesqai (see § 428). Even within the Greek itself, we have if he were wise expressed by ei) sofo\s ei)/h in Homer and by ei) sofo\s h)=n in Attic; and in Homer, both ou)k a)\n e)/gnws and ou)k a)\n gnoi/hs can mean you would not have discerned, while the latter can mean also you would not discern (in the same future sense as in Attic).

One doctrine of the original meaning of the Greek subjunctive and optative has gained such general approval of late, that it is entitled to special consideration. This teaches that the fundamental idea of the subjunctive is will, and that of the optative is wish. In the subjunctive, the idea of will appears especially in exhortations and prohibitions and in expressions of purpose. It can also be used to explain the subjunctive in protasis, by understanding e)/lqh| in h)\n e)/lqh| to mean originally let him go, suppose him to go (in some case). But before we can decide that will is the fundamental idea of the subjunctive, or even that it is a necessary and essential part of the idea of this mood, we must ask, first, whether it is essential to those uses of the subjunctive which we have a right on other grounds to call the most primitive; and, secondly, whether there is any other idea equally essential and equally primitive, from which the idea of will could have been evolved more simply and naturally than this could have been evolved from the idea of will.

The subjunctive nowhere bears more distinct marks of primitive simplicity than when it appears in Homer as a simple future; as in ou) ga/r pw toi/ous i)/don a)ne/ras ou)de\ i)/dwmai, for never yet have I seen such men, nor shall I ever see them, Il. i. 262, and in kai/ pote/ tis ei)/ph|sin, and some one will say, Il. vi. 459, followed by w(/s pote/ tis e)re/ei in vs. 462, referring to the same thing. See other examples in § 284. In this sense it is negatived by ou), like an indicative; and it may be modified by ke/ or a)/n, like the future indicative in Homer, and thus acquire a potential sense (see § § 285 and 286). It is seldom that any modal form (except a plain indicative) is found so free from associations which might affect its meaning and conceal its original character. It has, moreover, its exact counterpart in Sanskrit in the Vedic subjunctive, which is negatived by na/, the equivalent of ou).¹ This simple subjunctive has no element of will. It expresses what the speaker regrets as readily as what he is resolved to do. Thus in both the examples above quoted, the subjunctive expresses an act which is decidedly contrary to the speaker's will and wish. This subjunctive and the future indicative run parallel in all their constructions, and the former expresses will only so far as the latter does. The only character that is beyond question in this subjunctive is its reference to future time, and if we were left to this use alone, we should have no hesitation in designating the subjunctive as a form expressing futurity like a future tense. As this use cannot be deduced from the subjunctive as an expression of will, let us see whether the opposite process, the evolution from the simple future meaning of the uses in which will appears, is any easier and does any less violence to the principles of the language.

The use of the subjunctive which strikes every one as coming next in simplicity to the Homeric construction just described is seen in exhortations, like i)/wmen, let us go, and (in its negative form) in prohibitions, like mh\ i)/wmen, let us not go, mh\ ei)/phte tou=to, do not say this. This use of the subjunctive is found also in Sanskrit, and its negative is there generally (though not always) mA, the equivalent of mh/. It thus appears that the marked distinction which is seen in the early Greek between i)/wmen, we shall go, and i)/wmen, let us go, in both positive and negative forms, was probably inherited from an ancestral language, so that we need not seek for the development of this distinction within the Greek itself. It is obvious that the future element is equally strong in both expressions, while the hortatory subjunctive also expresses will. Now it is much more natural to suppose that a future form expressing exhortation or prohibition originated in a form expressing mere futurity, than that the merely future form originated in the exhortation or prohibition. We cannot derive ou)k i)/dwmai, I shall not see, from mh\ i)/dwmai, let me not see. But it is by no means impossible that, in some language which was a common ancestor of Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit, subjunctive (i.e. originally future) forms came to be used to express both commands and prohibitions; that, when these imperative expressions became distinguished from the subjunctive in its ordinary future sense, they adopted the negative (the ancestor of mâ ' and mh/) which was used with similar imperative forms, though this use of the negative might not at first be very rigid; and that thus mh/ i)/wmen, in the sense let us not go, became established in early Greek as opposed to ou)k i)/wmen, we shall not go. In Sanskrit, however, the use of mA/ in such cases was less fixed, and here na/ (the equivalent of ou)) is sometimes found with the subjunctive in prohibitions.² This last is what we should have if in xeiri\ d' ou) fau/seis pote/, you shall never touch me, EUR. Med. 1320, we could substitute an Homeric subjunctive (e.g. yau/sh|s) for the future indicative. The cases of mh/ with the future in prohibitions given in § 70, like mh\ boulh/sesqe ei)de/nai, do not wish to know, DEM. xxiii. 117, are too few to be of much weight in the discussion; but they seem to show an abortive tendency to establish the future indicative with mh/ by the side of the subjunctive in prohibitions. What the future could do in an imperative sense is shown by examples like “pa/ntws de\ tou=to dra/seis,” “but by all means do this,” AR. Nub. 1352 , and others quoted in § 69; but the natural negative here was ou), not mh/, as in ou) yau/seis above.

If the origin of the interrogative subjunctive in appeals (§ 287) and of its negative mh/ has been correctly explained in §§ 288 and 291, this is merely an interrogative form of the subjunctive in exhortations and prohibitions, and calls for no special discussion here. The origin of the use of the subjunctive with ou) mh/ is still to uncertain to give this construction much weight in determining the essential character of the subjunctive. If the view of this construction which is advocated in this work (see Appendix II.) is accepted, the form is an offshoot of the prohibitory subjunctive. If it is thought to be an original construction, expressing a strong denial or prohibition by its own force, the subjunctive appears in its original future force. Whatever theory we may have of the origin of this subjunctive, the form is interchangeable in use with the future indicative.

In dependent sentences, the subjunctive is used in two constructions, —in so-called final clauses, and in conditional sentences. In negative final constructions with mh/, the subjunctive was originally prohibitive (§§ 262, 307); in positive clauses with the final particles, it expresses something aimed at, that is, an object of will. But here, as in independent sentences, to derive the more complex from the more simple is far more natural than the reverse. Further, in all final constructions the future indicative may be used in the same sense as the subjunctive; this could hardly be done if the subjunctive contained an essential element of will which is wanting in the future. Again, the subjunctive is very common in final constructions after past tenses, where the optative is the regular form (318); it cannot be supposed that the idea of will is present in such final clauses when they have the subjunctive (as they generally do in Thucydides) and is absent when they have the optative (as is more common in Xenophon). In conditional sentences, although we may explain the subjunctive as originally hortatory, h)\n e)/lqh| meaning let him come (we will suppose), it is more natural to refer this use to the primitive use of the subjunctive as a simple future, ei)/ ken e)/lqh| (or ei) e)/lqh|), in case he shall come, making a supposition of a future event of which the Homeric e)/lqh|, he will come, might make a statement (see §§ 11 and 398). We thus avoid the necessity of explaining the indicative and the subjunctive in protasis on different principles. As each of the various tenses of the indicative with ei) expresses a supposition in the time which it naturally denotes (§ 3, c), so the subjunctive is a natural form to express a future supposition. Thus, as ei) genh/setai tou=to supposes what genh/setai tou=to states, ei) ge/nhtai tou=to naturally supposes what (in the older language) ge/nhtai tou=to, this will happen, states. As the former cannot be explained by the idea of will, it seems unnecessary and illogical to introduce this idea to account for the latter. What has been said of ordinary conditional sentences applies also to relative conditions.

The only use of the subjunctive in conditions which cannot be derived from the simple future meaning is that in general suppositions; but the undeveloped state of this construction in Homer and other considerations make it highly probable, if not certain, that this is a use of the subjunctive which grew up within the Greek language itself at a comparatively late period, and that it is not one of the primitive uses of the mood. (See §§ 11, b, 400, 401.)

It is certain that no trace of the subjunctive as a mood of will can be seen in its actual use in conditional sentences. Thus h)\n th\n po/lin e(/lwsi could always be said as properly by the friends as by the enemies of a city, by the besieged as well as by the besiegers. In Il. iii. 71, o(ppo/tero/s ke nikh/sh|, spoken by Priam, is, as an expression, perfectly neutral as regards the hope or desire of victory. It may be said with truth, that the primitive meaning of a verbal form is apt to be weakened, or even to disappear, in actual use. But is it logical to assume a lost meaning to account for an expression, when the meaning which remains accounts for it satisfactorily without external help? When we find h)\n e(/lwsi th\n po/lin actually expressing a mere future supposition, with no idea of will, in all periods of the language, and when we find e(/lwsi meaning they will capture in the earliest period that we know, why should we assume an original idea of will (which was afterwards lost) in h)\n e(/lwsi to account for its actual meaning? The view of the conditional sentence here adopted is confirmed by paratactic conditions like the following: qu/seis de\ th\n pai=d' : e)/nqa ti/nas eu)xa\s e)rei=s; I. A. 1185, where qu/seis makes a supposition, supposing you shall sacrifice the girl, which would generally be expressed by ei) qu/seis or h)\n qu/sh|s: so a)dikei= tis e(kw/n and e)ch/marte/ tis a)/kwn, both expressing suppositions, DEM. xviii. 274.³

On these grounds we may feel justified in regarding the subjunctive as originally and essentially a form for expressing future time, which the Greek inherited, with its subdivision into an absolute future negatived by ou) and a hortatory future negatived by mh/, and used in independent sentences.

The name optative mood (e)/gklisis eu)ktikh/), which was invented by grammarians long after the usages of the language were settled, designated the mood by the only use which it then had in independent sentences without a)/n, that of wishing. It is evident that this name in itself is no ground for assuming that wishing was the primitive function, or even an essential function, of the optative, any more than the name of the subjunctive (e)/gklisis u(potaktikh/) would lead us to assume dependence as an original or necessary characteristic of that mood. We have already mentioned the theory that the optative is the mood of wish, as the complement of that which makes the subjunctive the mood of will. This theory finds no support in the potential use of the optative with or without ke/ or a)/n, which is the only independent use of the optative except in wishes and exhortations. Surely a)po/loito a)/n, he would perish, can never have been developed from a)po/loito, may be perish, for the former is no more likely to be said by one who wishes the death of a person than by one who fears it, and there is nothing in the addition of a)/n or ke/ which can reasonably be supposed to change a form, which in itself expresses wish, to a neutral form or even to one expressing what is feared. The fundamental distinction in negative sentences between mh\ a)po/loito and ou)k a)\n a)po/loito (or ou)k a)po/loito