James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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διαγόμενος. The use of this verb in Soph. El. 782 χρόνος διῆγέ με, Dem. 18. 89 πόλεμος—διῆγεν ὑμᾶς, Xen. Rep. Lac. I 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος (‘living’) as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Laws 758 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διάγω.

ἐγὼ γὰρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: ‘do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?’ i.e. think that it is not a question of βίου διαγωγή. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is “wanting in point.” It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture ἔγωγ᾽ ἄῤ for ἐγὼ γὰρ (Observ. Crit. p. 11).

ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε . ἤτοι or ἤτοι—γε= ‘or else’ (not ‘or rather’ as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἤτοι—ἤ, and ἤ—ἤτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Nem. 6. 5. With the use of ἤτοι in this passage cf. III 400 C, IV 433 A τοῦτό ἐστιν—ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Emendations have been suggested on all these passages of Plato: here ἤ τοι (van Prinsterer, Hartman) and in the other two passages ἤ: but we are not justified in altering the text. Cf. Kugler de partic. τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 14.