James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός. This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. Phil. 36 D, where Protarchus is addressed in the words ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τἀνδρός. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from Phil. 11 A, B, 11 C δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι: Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 19 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the ‘children of Thrasymachus.’ They are διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B (ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον), 367 A and 367 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not “ridiculous” (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in Cl. Rev. X p. 237.

ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr.^{4} II p. 283.

τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην: perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XIII 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See Introd. § 3.

παῖδες -- ἀνδρός. By Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but Ἀρίστων suggests ἄριστος (cf. IX 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on ὦ παῖδες above. In Symp. 174 B, when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun: ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί. (The διαφθορά consists in the substitution of ἀγαθῶν for δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being αὐτόματοι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read Ἀγάθων̓ i.e. Ἀγάθωνι for ἀγαθῶν: see Cl. Rev. X p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell Digest pp. 250 f. In κλεινοῦ Stallbaum finds a ‘lusus facetus’ on ἐκείνου; but this particular lusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.

θεῖον. The addition of τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III 388 D note θεῖος is here used, like ἔνθεος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf. Phaedr. 245 A, Ion 533 E, 535 E— 536 D.