James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον: cf. III 407 A and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 6. 1097^{b} 22—1098^{a} 17, where this discussion is closely imitated. That it is the ἔργον of soul (and in particular of νοῦς) to rule (ἄρχειν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and the like), is continually asserted in Plato: see for example Phaedr. 246 B πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, Crat. 400 A, Phil. 30C, Laws 896 A. The same doctrine is made the ground of the subjection of body to soul which is inculcated in the Phaedo (80 A, 94 B), and in Alc. I 130 A. Cf. also Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 180 ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἔκ τε τοῦ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς: αὐτοῖν δὲ τούτοιν οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις οὐκ ἂν φήσειεν ἡγεμονικωτέραν πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πλείονος ἀξίαν: τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον εἶναι βουλεύσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑπηρετῆσαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθεἶσιν.

ἐκείνου. The reading ἐκείνης—see cr. n.—can only be defended by supposing that Plato was guilty of a strange confusion, unless we make a pause at ἄλλῳ, and take ἤ as ‘or,’ not ‘than’; but ἤ after ἄλλῳ would certainly here be understood as ‘than,’ and an alternative question should be less ambiguously expressed. After ψυχῇ the corruption to ἐκείνης was natural enough. Madvig would eject the word.

τὸζῆν is κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν the ἔργον of ψυχή in Plato: cf. Crat. 399 D, E τοῦτο ἄρα (sc. ψυχή), ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ τελευτᾷ: ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι, and Phaed. 105 D. The influence of this idea makes itself felt in all the proofs of immortality in Plato, and not least in X 608 E ff. See notes ad loc.