James Adam, The Republic of Plato

τι εἶδος, like τρόπον τινά in 432 E and 433 B, hints, I think, that Civic Justice is not, after all, the true and original form of Justice. Hence, in 434 D, Plato is careful to warn us that the subject of Justice is not exhausted till individual Justice has been discussed. See on τοιοῦτο in 443 C.

ἐπιτηδειοτάτη . ἐπιτηδειότατα (Herwerden) is not good: cf. II 374 E and supra 430 A. A few MSS omit πεφυκυῖα, not unnaturally; but the reduplication in φύσις—πεφυκυῖα adds to the emphasis. Plato never tires of emphasizing the ‘natural’ features of his city in Books II—IV.

δικαιοσύνη has been questioned by Richards, on the ground that “the inference announced in τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. is already stated in καὶ μὴν ὅτι κτλ., which from its form (καὶ μήν) is yet evidently only a step in the reasoning.” Richards suggests δίκαιον, and Hartman δικαιοσύνης, neatly but needlessly. τοίνυν in B does not express an inference, but is simply ‘well,’ as in II 369 B, III 413 C, IV 436 B and a host of other passages collected by Kugler (de part. τοι etc. p. 35). Plato first states a popular view, and then proceeds to shew that it is mainly right on grounds presently to be stated (whence οἷσθ᾽ ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;). No stress should be laid on the fact that δικαιοσύνη is in one case the predicate, and in the other the subject: complete identity is predicated in both cases, as the abstract δικαιοσύνη shews. It might be different if we read δίκαιον, but for this there is no occasion. There is still however a difficulty in δικαιοσύνη: see next note.