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πότε -- μίσους ; τῷ is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles' ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος <*>μῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθομυθεύειν χρεών, ὅπου λώιον (Stob. Flor. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅπου λώιον. Cf. Soph. Fr. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ψεύδη λέγειν: | ὅτῳ δ᾽ ὄλεθρον δεινὸν ἁλήθεἰ ἄγει, | συγγνωστὸν εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. III 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV ch. 13. See also on III 389 B and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240 ff. ἆῤ οὐ -- πολεμίους κτλ. Cf. I 331 E— 332 B. τῶν καλουμένων φίλων depends on ἀποτροπῆς. If ὅταν διὰ μανίαν—τότε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπιχειρῶσι: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to οἳ ἂν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οἳ ἂν and τότε to τοῦτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ἕνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπῆς with φίλων. The clause ὅταν—πράττειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλουμένων, ‘so-called,’ involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἀνόητος καὶ μαινόμενος can be a friend to man (any more than to God: cf. 382 E).
The Republic of Plato. James Adam. 1902. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
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