E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

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ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος] ‘praise is derived from actions’, i.e. it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of ἔπαινος, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς, Eth. N. I 12, 1101 b 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and εὐδαιμονισμός and μακαρισμός, Introd. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34, p. 212 seq.

ἴδιον τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν] On προαίρεσις, see note, c. 6. 26. The προαίρεσις, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive characteristic of moral action. ‘Acting in accordance’ with this is consequently said to be ‘peculiar to’, the proprium, characteristic of ‘the man of worth’, or good man. In ‘praising’ any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, ‘we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose’.

φαίνεσθαι] ‘that he should be shewn to have’... ‘that it should be made clear that he has’... Note on I 7. 31, p. 141.

διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.τ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and therefore, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει, any ‘accidental coincidences’ and ‘pieces of luck’ (which may have happened to him); ‘for if a number of them can be brought forward ‘resembling’ the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for ‘a sign’ of it and of the moral purpose or intention’ (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the προαίρεσις or choice, and a certain ἕξις or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. συμπτώμα is a ‘concurrence’ or ‘accidental coincidence’ of one thing or act with another, between which there is no necessary connexion, and, like τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, purely accidental. ‘σύμπτωμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extrinsecus quippiam excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem deficere: ἀπὸ τύχης vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicuius rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.’ Victorius. On τύχη as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius's instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. infra, and Met. Δ 30, 1025 a 16. S.]

On σύμπτωμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, χρὴ οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν, ἢ λύσαντας οὕτω, συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ τόδε γενέσθαι. Δημοσθένης μέντοι ἐν τῷ κατὰ Διονυσοδώρου (p. 1295, 21) ἅπαξ εἴρηκε τοὔνομα. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. IV 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an ‘unfortunate accident’. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμβάν, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 C, in the sense of ‘a disease’ (morbus, Ast), apparently as a special kind of ‘calamity’. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1304 a 1 (where it means ‘an accident’, as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 b 6; II 12, 1274 a 12]; Top. Δ 5, 126 b 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 b 27, 31, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκλείπειν τὸν ἥλιον (an accidental coincidence), 463 a 2, τῶν συμπτωμάτων οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεται οὔθ̓ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable accident), de respir. 4, 572 b 26; de Gen. Anim. IV 4 § 10, 770 b 6 [and 777 b 8]; Hist. An. VII 6. 4, 585 b 25, σύμπτωσιν (accident), IX 37. 6, 620 b 35, 40. 41, 626 a 29. Categ. 8, 9 b 15; p. 199 a 1; p. 1093 b 17. The medical sense of the word ‘symptom’ seems to be derived immediately from the Aristotelian ‘accidental coincidence’. It is an attendant sign of the disease, though a mere external indication, and not of the essence of it; like a συμβεβηκός or ‘accident’.

§§ 33, 34. See the Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. II 1. 12, ἔτι δ᾽ οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων...ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἆλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι (Eth. N. I 12) ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ̓ ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου, ὁ δ̓ εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλος.

τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν] ‘The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds done’ (ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας, after they are done, the results of actions; ἔπαινος being of the actions themselves) ‘and the surrounding circumstances (such as noble birth¹ and cultivation) serve for confirmation’. These ‘surrounding circumstances’ are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for the picture, of which the real subject is the ‘deeds’ of the hero of the panegyric; what he has done himself;—nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco. The ‘confirmation’ consists in this,— ‘for’ it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of such and such a character (fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: ὡς ἀληθὲς ἦν ἄρα ἐσθλῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἐσθλὰ γίγνεσθαι τέκνα, κακῶν δ̓ ὅμοια τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ πατρός, Eur. Alcm. Fragm. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our praise is the ἕξις, the confirmed habit of virtue, the character and not the mere act; ‘because we should praise a man even if he had not done the (praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline him to do it’.

τὰ κύκλῳ occurs in the same sense, of ‘surrounding’ (or accompanying) ‘circumstances’, Eth. Nic. III 12, 1117 b 2, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δοξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν άνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ᾽ ἀφανίζεσθαι, where τὰ κύκλῳ are τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ πόνοι, ‘the pains and dangers by which courage is sur rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end’; again, Rhet. III 14. 10, οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλῳ.