E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

‘This (declamation, ὑπόκρισις) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing it, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or tones of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle’ (circumflex, from the combination of the two others, ́̀ = ~), ‘and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time’.

οἷον] is here in both cases videlicet, ‘that is to say’, a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, ‘for instance’, as an example or specimen, which supposes other things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus οἷον here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere examples of a much larger class, but they specify the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, Pol. I 6, sub fin., δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. ἡ δὲ κτητική...οἷον ἡ δικαία. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας κ.τ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. II 5, 1264 a 26, οἷον φρούρους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἷον, ‘I mean to say.’ De Sens. c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷον πῦρ ἀὴρ ὕδωρ γῆ. Plat. Gorg. 502 D. [Cf. supra II 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see Cic. de Or. III. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and μέγεθος, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book III, p. 379 seq.

‘Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (lit. out of, as the produce or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudge the prizes), than the poets nowadays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the vicious, depraved character) of our constitutions’ (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotle, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which ‘acting’ thereby acquires, are attributed here to the constitution—comp. I 1. 4, where ‘well-governed states’, εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, ὑγιής, ὀρθή, opposed to μοχθηρά, they would not be allowed there. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the audience: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they require the stimulus of these distorting (διαστρέφοντα, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of acting in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero's description, de Or. III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, quae sic ab illo csse acta constabat oculis voce gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent. And Orat. c. XVII, est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quum constet e voce et motu, § 55 and the rest.