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‘Now that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism has been already stated (I 2. 8, and 13), and also how (in what respects) it is a syllogism, and wherein it differs from those of dialectics (I 2. 11); for’— these are two of the differences—‘we must neither go very far back, nor introduce all the steps (of the regular syllogism), in drawing our inferences; the one is obscure by reason of its length, the other is mere chattering (idle talk, or vain repetition, leading to nothing, III 3. 3), because it states what everybody sees already (what is already evident)’.

οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν κ τ.λ.] This is a manifest reference to I 2. 13, where both of these two things which the rhetorician has to avoid are expressly mentioned.

First, he must not deduce his inference, the conclusion which he wishes to establish, by a long train of connected syllogisms from a remote distance, συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον... ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος, γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς. Comp. I 2. 12, ἔστι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς (τῆς ῥητορικῆς)...ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. (Comp. Topic. A 11, 105 a 8, where this is extended to dialectical argumentation. A similar precept is given in III 17. 6. πόρρωθεν of ‘farfetched’ metaphors, III 2. 12. Comp. III 3. 4.) This will only puzzle his ‘simple’ audience, whose powers of perception and memory will be alike unable to keep pace with him. The reasoning of the rhetorician must be as clear and as brief as possible.

Secondly, he must draw his conclusion without expressing all that belongs to the regular syllogism; this is also for the sake of brevity; the formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say, and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because it expresses a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the conclusion; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in which the reasoning will be intelligible without it: anything that is absolutely φανερόν should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that of the dialectical syllogism.

With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent: to the rhetorician, the time allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour, and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism, that in the former οὐ πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν. πάντα may also include, what Schrader adds, “multas propositiones probabiles, communes, intempestivas,” which “plane omitti debere praecipit.”

On ἀδολεσχία, see note on III 3. 3. Eth. N. III 13, 1118 a I. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

τοῦτο γάρ] γάρ here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of ‘a reason assigned’: the fact—that the uneducated are more convincing to a mob than your philosopher—is not the reason of the preceding statement, but rather the reverse; the previous statement explains (supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a case of that use of γάρ which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato represents by nämlich, videlicet; a use of the word which frequently occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it: though it is to be observed that if nämlich always represents the Greek γάρ (in these special cases), the English ‘namely’ will not always represent the German nämlich. [Comp. note 1 on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc. I. 25. 4.]

‘This, namely, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate) have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy), as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished speakers in a crowd’.

οἱ ποιηταί] is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual plus those like him. So we speak of ‘our Newtons and our Bacons’, as if there were several of them, ‘poets, Homers and Virgils’; or else conveys contempt, ‘don't talk to me of your Hegels and Schellings’ (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, ψευδοκήρυκας, of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin). Sim. Plat. Rep. III 387 C, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας. Aesch. Agam. 1414, Χρυσηΐδων μείλιγμα τῶν ὑπ᾽ Ἰλίῳ. (Longin. περὶ ὕψους § 23, ἐξῆλθον Ἕκτορές τε καὶ Σαρπήδονες, Eur. Rhes. 866, οὐκ οἶδα τοὺς σοὺς οὓς λέγεις Ὀδυσσέας. Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, Catonibus atque Cethegis, Lucan, Phars. I 313, nomina vana, Catones, quoted in Blomfield's Gloss. ad loc.) Arist. Ran. 1041, Πατρόκλων Τεύκρων Θυμολεόντων (characters of Aeschylus). See Valckn. ad Theocr. Adon. line 141, sub fin. Δευκαλίωνας.

The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur. Hippol. 989, οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς φαῦλοι, παρ᾽ ὄχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν. The same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 B.

μουσικός, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed from the notion of cultivation, literary and intellectual, which the term expresses: hence ‘skilled in’, ‘highly trained or cultivated’ in the practice of a particular art. So Rost and Palm Lex. wohlunterrichtet, geschickt. “Accomplished in” seems to unite the two meanings; general cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast's Lex. Plat., on μουσικῶς: “Et in universum decenter. Plat. Rep. III 403 A, ἔρως πέφυκε ...μουσικῶς ἐρᾷν, Legg. VII 816 C.”

‘For the one (the πεπαιδευμένοι) talk about generals and universals, the others about (lit. ‘from’, the materials from which the speech is derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near, that is, to our observation, things sensible; and to our interests, those which nearly concern us)’. The κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου are the general or abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular knowledge and interests. The artist also is conversant with ‘generals’ and not with ‘particulars or individuals’: the rules of art are all general rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular: μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου. Metaph. A 1, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2. 11, II 19. 27. But although these abstract universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, καθ᾽ αὑτά, ἁπλῶς, τῇ φύσει γνωριμώτερα, that is, convey a higher and more comprehensive kind of knowledge, yet to us, ἡμῖν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς, things of sense and the concrete, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer (ἐγγύς), clearer and more interesting, and in this sense, better known; the knowledge of these comes to us first, as the simpler πρότερον, appeals to our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with our lower nature1. The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or subjective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the beginning [p. 184 a 16], πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα: οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b 1, seq. Bonitz ad loc. Waitz ad Organ. 71 a 1, II 299, 71 b 24, p. 307. Trendelenburg ad de Anima p. 337 seq., Elem. Log. Ar. § 19, p. 82.

‘We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all possible opinions’ (“ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur.” Victorius); ‘but select them out of those which are defined or determined or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either by the judges (i. e. their known opinions: this in a law case) or those whose authority they accept’.

That is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which may indeed be included amongst opinions (because they are believed as well as known) but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν, I 2. 11; and besides this, “every fool has some opinions”, I 2. 11; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade— we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2. 1, yet that in practice it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and therefore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics, from political and social philosophy, ib. § 7.

Here however there is a still further restriction—we must select out of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our immediate purpose: for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges) themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they regard as authorities are known to approve. κρίνειν and κριτής, as we have seen, II 1. 2; 18. 1, may be extended to the decision of audiences in all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the θεαταί or θεωροί of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however κρίνουσιν is qualified by οἷον, which shews that there are other analogous cases, the two audiences of indirect κρίνοντες may perhaps be left to be understood.

τῶν δοκούντων] ‘probable opinions’, comp. II 1. 6; 25. 2, and φαίνεται in I 2. 11, and in the succeeding clause.

καὶ τοῦτο δέ] ‘And this too should be clear—the speaker should be quite certain—that it does so appear to—that this is really the opinion of—all or most (of any audience)’.—If δέ be retained (so Bekker), compare note on I 6. 22. MS A^{c} δή. Quaere δεῖ? Victorius seems to understand it so, as he uses the word debet; perhaps supposing that the notion of ‘ought’ is carried on from the preceding λεκτέον: and this is confirmed by the following συνάγειν.

‘And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propositions, but also from those that are only true for the most part’, probabilities. The τεκμήριον, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is the only necessary argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are εἰκότα and σημεῖα, things by their very name and nature only probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, that the necessary propositions and conclusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 32—36.

1 φύσις is used in more than one sense: thus it may be applied to the normal or abstract notion of nature, its true and highest form, perfect nature; or an imperfect nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.

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