[140] ψεύσομαι. This is commonly taken to mean, ‘Is what I am going to say correct or not?’ as Ameis ‘werde ich mich irren?’ To which there are two objections: (1) as Nitzsch (inconsistently with his own adoption of the common interpretation) observes, “ψεύδεσθαι” is not simply mendacium dicere, but mentiri,—to say what is false, not in the belief that it is true, but knowing it to be false (but cp. Pl. Symp.215A “ἑκὼν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύσομαι”): and (2) that “κέλεται δέ με θυμός” ‘I have a great mind to do it,’ does not suit ἔτυμον ἐρέω in this sense. The following interpretation seems decidedly preferable. Helen represents herself as deliberating on her own question, “ἴδμεν δή”; and debating whether to answer it or not. The alternative is not between uttering a truth and uttering a falsehood, but between uttering the truth and uttering nothing. So much is plain from the parallel, Il.10. 532“Νέστωρ δὲ πρῶτος κτύπον ἄιε, φώνησέν τε:”
“ψεύσομαι ἦ ἔτυμον ἐρέω; κέλεται δέ με θυμός:”“ἵππων μ᾽ ὠκυπόδων ἀμφὶ κτύπος οὔατα βάλλει”. It follows that “ψεύσομαι” means, ‘Shall I withhold the truth?’ The first member of the antithesis has no stress laid upon it, but only serves to throw the second into relief; so that the modified meaning of ‘suppressio veri’ will satisfy “ψεύσομαι”. In antitheses, especially in such as are colloquial, one part of the expression often goes beyond the meaning: thus Soph. Antig.1108“ἴτ᾽ ἴτ᾽ ὀπάονες”,
“οἵ τ᾽ ὄντες οἵ τ᾽ ἀπόντες”, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 9, 11 “δεῖ . . μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα μήθ᾽ ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα”. And so here we must be content to neglect the proper force of “ψεύσομαι” and regard it as an expedient for enhancing the force of “ἔτυμον ἐρέω”.
